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INTRODUCTION
Debates in legal philosophy tend to take place in rarified air, involving highly theoretical and abstract arguments about conceptually
possible legal systems, while rarely concerning themselves with the actual governments and legal systems that we mortals encounter here on
earth. Still, it can be helpful—both for the legal philosophers and the
more general legal community—to drag these theoretical arguments
down from the stratosphere and see how they can be adapted to describe and explain the workings of an actual legal system. Through
such an exercise, legal philosophers may “check their work,” so to
speak, uncovering the flaws that become apparent when their theories
are put through the rigors of reality, and practitioners can see how the
underlying theoretical framework of the nature of law itself might
help them to understand, and perhaps even improve, the functioning
of their particular legal system.
1
The positivist account of law provided by H.L.A. Hart in his semi2
nal work, The Concept of Law, provides an obvious choice for application to an existing legal system. It is no exaggeration to say that Hart’s
work has set the context, terminology, and structure of the central
3
debates in jurisprudence over the last fifty years. In addition, almost
all of the most important contributions to legal philosophy over that
4
period have been either rejections of Hart’s theory or attempts to re-

1

Positivism is a broad concept containing many variations on a theme, but it may
be defined generally as “[t]he theory that legal rules are valid only because they are
enacted by an existing political authority or accepted as binding in a given society, not
because they are grounded in morality or in natural law.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
906 (7th ed. 1999). The positivists attempt to explain the law in a value-neutral, empirical manner, in an effort to divorce jurisprudential thought from what they perceive
to be the limitations of natural law and its normative (or moral) explanations of the
nature of law. The central debate among contemporary positivists concerns the severity
of this separation between law and morality, with some positivists arguing that certain
laws may be valid because of their moral character, while others claim that law can always be identified by social practice without reference to morality. See infra Section I.C.
2
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
3
See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, Preface to HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at v ( Jules Coleman ed., 2001) (“The Concept of Law is
the most influential and important book in the analytic tradition of jurisprudence written in the second half of the twentieth century.”).
4
See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, The Model
of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Model of
Rules I ]; RONALD DWORKIN, The Model of Rules II, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra,
at 46 [hereinafter DWORKIN, The Model of Rules II ]; JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND
NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
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5

fine, modify, or develop it. Hart’s most important contribution to legal theory is arguably the introduction of the concept of “the rule of
6
recognition” —the ultimate criteria of legal validity in a given legal
system—which fundamentally altered the longstanding clash between
7
legal positivists and natural-law theorists about the nature of law. The
rule of recognition is a complex idea, but it may be described most
simply as the rule that is used to identify those other rules that are
8
valid as law in a given legal system.
To bring Hart’s theory outside of a purely theoretical debate, then,
one must show how his understanding of law itself can provide an individual in a given legal system with some articulation of that system’s
rule of recognition; that is, it must provide the individual with a rule,
whether complex or simple, that would allow that individual to determine whether a given norm is or is not a law in that system. Therefore, for it to be practically useful, Hart’s concept of the rule of recognition should be applicable to an existing legal system. In applying
this theory to reality, one will hopefully be able, first, to uncover some
of the strengths and weaknesses of Hart’s highly influential account of
the nature of law, and, second, to provide the legal theorists of a given
legal system with a better understanding of how their system works.
Hart at least made a passing attempt to tether his theory to reality
by suggesting, by way of example, that the rule of recognition for the
9
United Kingdom is “what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law.”
Whether or not this statement is an accurate description of that legal
5

See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
MATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY
ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979).

PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAG(2001); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW:

6

HART, supra note 2, at 94-110.
This argument can be traced back through the history of political philosophy,
with a list of important contributors that includes such luminaries as Plato, Aristotle, St.
Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and John Stuart Mill.
8
Hart himself explains that
7

[t]he existence of . . . a rule of recognition may take any of a huge variety of
forms, simple or complex. It may, as in the early law of many societies, be no
more than that an authoritative list or text of the rules is to be found in a written document or carved on some public monument. . . .
In a developed legal system the rules of recognition are of course more
complex; instead of identifying rules exclusively by reference to a text or list
they do so by reference to some general characteristic possessed by the [valid]
primary rules. This may be the fact of their having been enacted by a specific
body, or their long customary practice, or their relation to judicial decisions.
HART, supra note 2, at 94-95.
9
Id. at 107.
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system, it has proven much harder to provide a similarly succinct rule
for the United States. Due to the myriad complications inherent in
10
the United States legal system, Hart’s supposedly simple positivist description of the law has proven quite difficult to apply. In his famous
and powerful critique of Hart’s theory, Ronald Dworkin asserts that
the difficulties that arise when trying to apply the Hartian model to
11
the United States demonstrate fatal flaws in the theory. In Dworkin’s
view, because Hart’s positivist thesis fails to account for some of the
most essential components of legal systems like America’s, positivism
ultimately fails as an account of law in general. If Hart’s theory is to
have any practical effect for citizens of the United States, then, it must
answer Dworkin’s criticism and account for those parts of the American legal system that Hart’s theory seemingly denies or ignores.
A few theorists have attempted to formulate such a rule of recognition for the United States. This Comment will present and critique
those previous accounts, ultimately building upon them to suggest a
plausible American rule of recognition. Part I focuses on Hart’s theory, Dworkin’s criticism, and the response to that criticism by the socalled “soft” or “inclusive” positivists. Part II documents and evaluates
previous attempts to provide a rule of recognition in the United
States, beginning with the work of Kent Greenawalt and then moving
to the more recent debate between Kenneth Einar Himma and Matthew Kramer. Finally, Part III presents my own account of the rule of
recognition in the United States, and argues that an inclusive-positivist
rule of recognition can be created for our legal system, but only if certain controversial empirical assumptions about the nature of law in
the United States are correct. Through the process of developing this
rule, I uncover some of the deficiencies in Hart’s account of the nature of law and present some possible solutions to the problems that
these deficiencies present. Furthermore, I explore how certain theories of American constitutional law—most importantly, theories involving some form of popular constitutionalism—may prove to be in-

10

These complications include, as just a cursory summary, those involving constitutional amendments, judicial review, the separation of powers both between the three
branches of government and between the federal and state governments, and the
question of constitutional interpretation, including the problematic idea of popular
constitutionalism.
11
See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4 (arguing that Hart’s theory of law
fails to account adequately for features like judicial discretion in the United States); see
also infra Section I.B.
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compatible with a plausible positivist theory of law for the United
States.
I. HART, DWORKIN, AND INCLUSIVE POSITIVISM:
THE DEBATE IN THE BACKGROUND
A. Hart and the Rule of Recognition
In 1961, H.L.A. Hart changed the context of modern jurisprudential debate by introducing his concept of the rule of recognition and
the corresponding positivist account of law. Most importantly, Hart
argued that law is a social fact and thus can be distinguished from mo12
rality. As opposed to moral norms, which are true regardless of social practice or acceptance, legal norms, according to Hart, are explic13
itly determined by social practice.
Thus, Hart offered his own
descriptive theory of law, derived from rules of conduct, where a rule
is a “kind of complex social practice that consists of a general and
regular pattern of behavior among some group of persons, together
with a widely shared attitude within the group that this pattern is a
common standard of conduct to which all members of the group are
14
required to conform.”
Hart distinguishes between two possible attitudes that can be
taken toward such norms, which he calls the “internal” and “external”
points of view. If the individual is an observer of the norm but does
not actually accept the norm as binding, that individual has an external point of view. If, on the other hand, an individual accepts the
norm and uses it as her guide for conduct, then the individual can be
said to have taken the internal point of view. The internal point of
12

The positivist attempt to explain law in a value-neutral, empirical manner may
be summarized by John Austin’s statement that “[t]he existence of law is one thing; its
merit or demerit is another.” JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 157 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). One of
Hart’s primary goals was, however, to further positivism’s descriptive aims by advancing
past Austin’s limiting description of law as merely orders backed by threats issued from
a habitually followed sovereign. Hart argued that Austin’s account fails to describe certain fundamental and necessary varieties of law, such as the power to create obligations
through contract and the continuity of law over time. See HART, supra note 2, chs. 2-3.
13
Positivists describe this as the Social Fact Thesis, which “asserts that the existence of law is made possible by certain kinds of social fact.” Kenneth Einar Himma,
Inclusive Legal Positivism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 125, 125 ( Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002). This Part borrows
heavily from Himma’s excellent and insightful summary of Hart’s theory.
14
Stephen Perry, Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of View, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2006).
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view is useful for determining when a social norm transforms into a
“rule” and thus rises above the level of a mere convergent social
15
habit. A social norm becomes a rule “when the general demand for
conformity is insistent and the social pressure brought to bear upon
16
those who deviate or threaten to deviate is great.” Thus, in Hart’s
theory, a rule has both a behavioral element, with a convergent pattern
of conduct, and a cognitive element, where participants develop a critical, reflective attitude toward the norm and criticize deviations from
17
that norm by others in the community. This is often called the “conventional” nature of Hart’s account, where “[r]ules are conventional
social practices if the general conformity of a group to them is part of
the reasons which its individual members have for acceptance.”18
According to Hart, every legal system has criteria by which it dis19
tinguishes legal rules from nonlegal norms. Hart describes these criteria by first distinguishing between “primary rules,” or rules that require the participants of a legal system to do or abstain from doing
certain actions, and secondary rules, which “provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the
primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways deter20
mine their incidence or control their operations.” A legal system advances past a “primitive” state and becomes “fully developed” when it
21
The rule of
moves past primary rules to include secondary rules.

15

Hart’s example of a social convention that does not rise to the level of law is the
proposition that all Englishmen go to the cinema on Saturday nights. Because no one
would criticize the individual Englishman who stays home on Saturday night, the regular moviegoing practice is merely a convergent social habit and not a “rule.” See HART,
supra note 2, at 9-10, 55-56.
16
Id. at 86.
17
Kenneth Einar Himma, Making Sense of Constitutional Disagreement: Legal Positivism, The Bill of Rights, and the Conventional Rule of Recognition in the United States, 4 J.L.
SOC’Y 149, 153 (2003).
18
HART, supra note 2, at 255. Positivists call this the Conventionality Thesis.
Himma, supra note 13, at 125.
19
Positivists call this idea the Differentiation Thesis, where, under Hart’s account,
“[i]n every conceptually possible legal system S, there is a set of criteria CoV [criteria of
validity] such that a norm n is a law in S at a particular time t if and only if n satisfies
the criteria contained in CoV at t.” Himma, supra note 17, at 151.
20
HART, supra note 2, at 81.
21
For Hart, a legal system is “primitive” if it consists of just a series of primary rules
that assign duties and obligations to the citizenry. This is because a society that issues
only primary rules suffers from several deficiencies (Hart lists the main deficiencies as
uncertainty, a static nature, and inefficiency in enforcement). To make up for those
deficiencies, the society must issue secondary rules. These are of three types: rules of
change, which allow primary rules to be extinguished or modified; rules of adjudica-
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recognition, a special kind of secondary rule, provides the test for validity for all other rules, in that “[t]o say that a given rule is valid is to
recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recogni22
tion.”
Such a rule of recognition lies at the foundation of every
“fully developed” legal system and thus is a necessary condition for the
existence of a legal system. In those systems, it is the ultimate or supreme rule of the system and is not subject to some other test for its
23
own validity. Furthermore, the minimum conditions of a legal system require, first, that those rules of behavior that are deemed valid
by the rule of recognition be generally obeyed by the private citizens,
and, second and most importantly, that the officials in society adopt
the internal point of view with regard to this rule of recognition.
Thus, the average citizen need only obey the rules through his or her
actions, whereas the officials must hold the rule of recognition “as
[the] common standard[] of official behaviour and appraise critically
24
their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.” In summary, then,
the rule of recognition is the secondary rule that is accepted and practiced by officials in a given legal system as the ultimate criterion of va25
lidity in that system.

tion, which empower individuals to determine whether a primary rule has been broken; and, most importantly, the rule of recognition, which serves as an authoritative
acknowledgment that the primary rules are the proper way of doing things. A legal
system that contains these three types of secondary rules is, in Hart’s view, “fully developed.” See id. at 91-99.
22
Id. at 103. Therefore, using the example supra note 15, the norm that all Englishmen go to the movies on Saturday is neither a valid law nor a legal rule because it
was not enacted as law by the Queen in Parliament.
23
In this way, then, the rule of recognition is a statement of fact about the legal
system in question, but it is subject to two types of interpretation depending on the
individual’s point of view: the internal point of view (“It is the law that X ”) and the
external point of view (“In England, they recognize as law X ”). These points of view
make the rule of recognition both a matter of law (for those who adopt the internal
point of view) and a matter of fact (for those who adopt the external point of view).
24
HART, supra note 2, at 117. Matthew Adler stresses the importance of the “critical reflective attitude” of officials to the rule of recognition. Matthew D. Adler, Popular
Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW.
U. L. REV. 719, 732 (2006). Officials must not be merely obeying the rule but must actually accept it as “[a] social rule . . . [that] has determinate content only because there
is behavior that some individuals engage in, taking as normative a particular standard
(which they can grasp, if perhaps not exhaustively articulate) requiring that behavior.”
Id. (footnote omitted). This is also what positivists mean by the cognitive element of
the Conventionality Thesis. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
25
It is identifying who, exactly, these officials are that creates some of the most serious difficulties in determining the content of the rule of recognition in the United States.
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Hart thus constructs a complex explanation of the nature of law
without appealing to moral or normative explanations. Laws, for
Hart, are rules of behavior that require subjects and officials to behave
according to certain socially determined standards. Deviation from
these standards is not “wrong” in a moral sense, especially when
viewed from the external point of view. This explanation gives Hart
great latitude to recognize all sorts of social orderings as fully developed legal systems—laws must simply be valid according to the system’s rule of recognition to be a law and are not subject to some further, normative test of validity.
B. Dworkin’s Critique
Hart draws a sharp distinction between morality and law, making
clear that morality is not a necessary condition for law, and Dworkin
launches the main thrust of his attack against this very proposition.
Looking at the problem from the position of a judge in a legal system,
Dworkin argues that Hart’s account breaks down in “hard” or difficult
cases, where it is not clear what decision the positive law demands.
According to Dworkin, Hart is left to argue that, in these instances,
the law has “run out” and that judges must “make law” in these hard
cases. Neither judges nor the public, however, view the judge’s role as
being so discretionary as to allow the judge to make law in hard cases.
Instead, Dworkin asserts that the participants believe that judges are
restricted by the law in these instances, but a law that is grounded in
the very moral norms that Hart supposedly excludes. Dworkin calls
26
these moral norms with the force of law “principles.” Principles, he
argues, are distinguished from rules in that they are never officially

26

See DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 41-43 (“[T]here are at least
some rules of law that are not binding because they are valid under standards laid
down by a master rule but are binding—like a master rule—because they are accepted
as binding by the community.”). Dworkin’s favorite example of a principle is that “no
man may profit from his own wrong.” Id. at 25. As an example of the role that principles play in adjudication, Dworkin often uses the courts’ reliance on this principle to
countermand the positive law regarding wills in Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y.
1889), which held that a son who murdered his father cannot benefit by inheritance
laws that, read literally, would allow the son to inherit the majority of his father’s estate. See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 15-20; DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I,
supra note 4, at 23-45 (describing the centrality of principles in his critique of positivism). Positivists have taken to calling this criticism of Hart’s account (namely, that
Hart’s theory does not account for the role that principles play in cases like Riggs) the
Original Problem. See Himma, supra note 13, at 138 (attributing the origin of this concept to theorists’ responses to Dworkin’s analysis of Riggs).
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incorporated into the legal system through any procedure established
by a validity criterion (what Dworkin calls “pedigree”), but instead
simply exist as law. Additionally, unlike rules, which either apply fully
or not at all, principles have “weight,” in that contrasting principles
may be weighed against each other in hard cases. The fact that a
principle outweighs another principle in a given case does not reduce
the subordinated principle’s effect elsewhere.
Dworkin argues that what officials in a legal system (specifically
judges in his argument) really do is practice a process of what he calls
“constructive interpretation,” whereby they weigh the “preinterpretive
data” (positive law and principles) to determine the best decision in a
given case. This best interpretation takes into account the twin considerations of “fit” and “justification”—i.e., whether the decision sufficiently “fits” with precedent and the other preinterpretive data of the
system, and whether it is the morally best justified decision given considerations of justice, fairness, and procedural due process. Dworkin
thus believes that this is a better picture of actual social practice than
that provided by Hart, as judges attempt to interpret the law in the
best possible light while still considering themselves bound at all times
by the law, even when the positive law has “run out.”
But Dworkin’s theory is not conventionalist. It is explicitly both
normative and interpretive—a judge is bound to make the best moral
decision in a given case, regardless of the acceptance of that interpre27
tation by her fellow officials. However, that decision is necessarily
constrained by the notion of fit, and that fit is determined by the pre28
sent interpretation of the relevant past events. For Dworkin, therefore, officials decide hard cases by constructively interpreting the law
in a way that both best fits with the current interpretation of the relevant precedent and is best morally justified.
Dworkin’s main criticism of Hart, then, may be summarized as follows: Hart, by ignoring the role that moral norms or principles play in
judicial decision making, fails to provide an accurate account of how
judges decide hard cases. As a result, Hart’s model sees discretionary

27

See DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 4, at 256 (“Different judges will disagree
about [the best interpretation] and will accordingly take different views of what the law
of their community, properly understood, really is.”).
28
See id. at 227; see also Adler, supra note 24, at 738-39 (“[G]enuine U.S. law at present[, according to Dworkin,] is identified by a constructed rule of recognition that
integrates considerations of straight moral justifiability with the present, preinterpretive understanding of U.S. law shared by some groups of persons.”).
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power where judges are actually and, more importantly, legally constrained by moral norms.
C. Inclusive Positivism: The Positivist Answer to the Problem of Morality
Dworkin’s criticism presents a very real problem for the explanatory power of the positivists’ theory. One possible solution is to avoid
the criticism altogether by arguing that Hart and Dworkin are really
just talking past each other. Hart explicitly states that his is a descriptive model, an attempt to answer the sociological question, “What is
law?” The sociological positivist can argue that Dworkin, by contrast,
offers a normative model, exploring the more complex, normative
question, “What should law be?” Because they are asking different
questions, it is logical that they come to different answers.
This response, however, is not compelling. First, Dworkin argues
that Hart’s account is flawed descriptively and normatively. By failing
to make a place for the role that moral norms necessarily play in judicial decision making, Hart’s model fails to describe what Dworkin asserts to be a necessary feature of any system of law. From Dworkin’s
perspective, Hart’s model fails both sociologically and philosophically.
Second, the inclusion of the internal point of view in Hart’s account
requires at least some inquiry into how law’s normativity affects those
who take the internal point of view in a given legal system. In other
words, to be at all useful to actual participants in a legal system, Hart’s
account must at least show the committed participant where to look to
identify the law in that system.
29
Recognizing these problems, many positivists (including Hart )
have attempted to answer Dworkin’s attack by explaining that moral
norms, while not necessary for the existence of a legal system, may be
included in the rule of recognition of a given legal system. Such a
30
view is called “soft positivism” or “inclusive positivism,” and most of
29

Hart’s answer to Dworkin was posthumously published as the postscript to The
Concept of Law. See H.L.A. HART, Postscript, in HART, supra note 2, at 238.
30
Along with Hart, notable inclusive positivists include Jules Coleman, Wilfred
Waluchow, and Matthew Kramer. This position is contrasted with so-called “exclusive
positivism,” a position held by such legal philosophers as Joseph Raz and Scott Shapiro.
Exclusive positivists generally subscribe to the thesis that the existence of law can always be determined by social fact, without reference to moral norms. This split
amongst positivist theorists has important implications for any analysis of Hart’s rule of
recognition and will be a guiding consideration for the remainder of this Comment.
As this Comment, however, only touches upon those elements of the debate between
exclusive and inclusive positivists that are directly relevant to issues before us, I will discuss them only as they arise.
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its proponents hold to a thesis that says, approximately, that “there are
conceptually possible legal systems in which the legality criteria ‘incorporate’ substantive moral norms in the following sense: satisfaction of those norms is a necessary or sufficient condition for a propo31
sition to count as law.”
A strong form of this view would be that
“morality can be a condition of legality: that the legality of norms can
sometimes depend on their substantive (moral) merits, not just their
32
pedigree or social source.”
Inclusive positivists, then, adhere to
Hart’s argument that there is no necessary connection between law
and morality, but they reject the stronger argument that there cannot
be a connection between the two.
Most inclusive positivists subscribe to some variation of the Incorporation Thesis, which holds that “there are conceptually possible legal systems in which the validity criteria include substantive moral
33
norms.” The Incorporation Thesis has two possible components, describing the two ways in which a norm’s validity could depend upon its
34
moral content: a sufficiency component and a necessity component.
One possible articulation of the sufficiency component would be the
following: “[T]here are conceptually possible legal systems in which it
is a sufficient condition for a norm to be legally valid that it repro35
duces the content of some moral principle.”
Under this view, an
unpromulgated norm may be law simply because of its moral content.
This may be seen as a conformity relation—a norm is legally valid if it
36
conforms to a moral norm contained within the rule of recognition.
This argument is a direct response to Dworkin’s “Original Problem”:
if the sufficiency component is true, then a norm such as “no man
shall profit from his own wrong” may have legal validity—without
needing to pass some test for pedigree—where a similar moral norm
has been incorporated into a legal system’s rule of recognition. Thus,
37
some positivists have argued that “Dworkin’s criticism rests on a cari31

Kenneth Einar Himma, Final Authority to Bind with Moral Mistakes: On the Explanatory Potential of Inclusive Legal Positivism, 24 LAW & PHIL. 1, 1 (2005). Himma calls
this assertion the Incorporation Thesis.
32
Jules L. Coleman, Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT, supra note 3, at 99-100.
33
See Himma, supra note 13, at 136 (providing a historical overview of the Incorporation Thesis).
34
See id. at 136-41.
35
Id. at 136.
36
Id. at 136 n.21.
37
See, e.g., David Lyons, Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory, 87 YALE L.J. 415, 42324 (1977) (reviewing DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 4) (arguing that
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cature” of Hart’s view of the rule of recognition, in that positivists are
not required to hold that pedigree tests for legal validity necessarily
38
“exclude[] tests of ‘content.’” Under this view, there are “no constraints on the content of a rule of recognition, [and] a rule of recognition can incorporate validity criteria that make moral merit a suffi39
cient condition for legal validity.”
The second possible component of the Incorporation Thesis is
the necessity component. One possible articulation of the necessity
component would be that “there are conceptually possible legal systems in which it is a necessary condition for a norm to be legally valid
40
that its content be consistent with some set of moral norms.” This
component allows for moral norms to constrain promulgated law, in
that a duly enacted law will not be valid if its content conflicts with
some moral norm contained within the rule of recognition. This is a
consistency relation—a norm is legally valid if and only if it is consistent
41
with the moral content within the rule of recognition. Under this
condition, a law that contradicts some part of the moral content of the
rule of recognition will be invalid, even if it was adopted according to
42
valid law-creating procedures. Thus, contra Dworkin, inclusive positivists hold to some form of the Incorporation Thesis, containing either the sufficiency or necessity component (or both), which allows
moral norms to be incorporated into the criteria of validity as (1) a
constraint on legal validity and/or (2) a sufficient condition for legal
validity.
Dworkin, however, anticipated this solution and rejected it, arguing that even an inclusive rule of recognition cannot aid an official or
judge in determining how much weight a principle should have in a

Dworkin’s critique depends upon a “fundamental misconception of legal positivism”);
see also Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 146-47
(1982) (arguing that Dworkin’s understanding of positivism is untenable).
38
Himma, supra note 13, at 138-39 (quoting Lyons, supra note 37, at 423-24).
39
Id. at 139. “Hart is generally taken as accepting the Sufficiency Component [of
the Incorporation Thesis, even though he] never clearly and unambiguously endorsed
it.” Id.
40
Id. at 136.
41
Id. at 136 n.21.
42
Hart deals directly with constitutions (and the United States Constitution in particular) on this issue. He writes, “[T]here is nothing in my book to suggest that the . . .
criteria provided by the rule of recognition must be solely matters of pedigree; they may
instead be substantive constraints on the content of legislation such as the Sixteenth or
Nineteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” HART, supra note 29, at
250. This statement suggests that Hart believed that an inclusive-positivist rule of recognition for the United States could be formulated, though he never attempted to do so.
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given case. But, the inclusivists respond, there is nothing about the
rule of recognition that requires it to provide a test that eliminates
uncertainty as to what legally valid norms and principles require. The
inclusivists point to Hart’s concept of the “open texture” of law, which
leaves room for uncertainty in applying the rule of recognition to determine what the law requires in a given case. As Hart notes, “however smoothly [the rule of recognition may] work over the great mass
of ordinary cases, [it] will, at some point where [its] application is in
question, prove indeterminate; [the rule] will have what has been
44
termed an open texture.” Thus, according to Hart, Dworkin is incorrect in assuming that “any legal issue arising in any case could simply
be solved by mere appeal to the criteria or tests provided by the
45
rule.”
In the inclusivist’s view, the rule of recognition specifically
concerns validation conditions, wherein “a legal norm has the property of validity because and only because it satisfies the criteria con46
tained in the rule of recognition,” and does not necessarily also set
out identification conditions, as Dworkin assumes.
Similarly, while there must not be disagreement among officials as
to law ascertainment under the rule of recognition, the rule need not
settle all questions of law application. In fact, there may be significant
disagreement amongst officials as to how the law applies in a given
case. According to inclusivists, Dworkin mistakenly assumes in his
criticism of judicial discretion that a disagreement between judges and
officials about the application of laws is also a disagreement about the
ascertainment of the sources of law. Of course, Dworkin is correct in
observing that if a significant number of officials in a legal system differ about the sources of law, then, under Hart’s definition of the rule
of recognition as a conventional social rule (the Conventionality Thesis), there is a breakdown in the legal system. But he fails to see that
there are two conceivable types of disagreement about the rule of recognition: “(1) disagreement about what standards constitute the rule
of recognition; and (2) disagreement about what propositions satisfy

43

DWORKIN, The Model of Rules I, supra note 4, at 40 (“We argue for a particular
principle by grappling with a whole set of shifting, developing and interacting standards . . . . We could not bolt all of these together into a single ‘rule’, even a complex
one, and if we could the result would bear little relation to Hart’s picture of a rule of
recognition . . . .”).
44
HART, supra note 2, at 128.
45
HART, supra note 29, at 258.
46
Himma, supra note 13, at 143.
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47

those standards.” As long as the controversy is not over the content
of the rule itself (proposition (1)), but “over which norms satisfy the
48
standards set forth in it” (proposition (2)), Hart’s account of the
rule of recognition as a social rule is not threatened by the mere existence of official disagreement.
Lastly, it is important to note that many inclusive positivists hold a
strong form of the Conventionality Thesis, in which they view the rule
of recognition not merely as conventional but also as duty imposing.
Emphasizing Hart’s account of the internal point of view of officials as
necessitating a critically reflective attitude, inclusive positivists like
Jules Coleman argue that the rule of recognition is “most plausibly
49
thought of as being a shared cooperative activity (SCA).” Himma
explains,
Coleman identifies three characteristic features of an SCA: (1) each participant in an SCA attempts to conform her behaviour to the behaviour
of the other participants; (2) each participant is committed to the joint
activity; and (3) each participant is committed to supporting the efforts
of the other participants to play their appropriate roles within the joint
50
activity.

Under the SCA account, officials are obligated to apply the rule of
recognition in the “discharging [of] their official functions and . . . it
is the rule of recognition that autonomously gives rise to this obliga51
tion.” The SCA account solves a problem posed by Hart’s weaker
conventional account of the rule of recognition, in that Hart’s conventional rule could not give rise to autonomous obligation, as mere
convention does not obligate. But, insofar as commitments induce
the reliance of others and create justified expectations, they give rise
to obligation. Viewing the ultimate rule as an SCA allows for the rule

47

Id. at 145.
Coleman, supra note 37, at 156.
49
See Himma, supra note 13, at 131. For a discussion of SCAs generally, see Adler,
supra note 24, at 750-65, Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV.
327 (1992), and Scott J. Shapiro, Law, Plans and Practical Reasons, 8 LEGAL THEORY 387
(2002).
50
Himma, supra note 13, at 131-32. Different legal philosophers emphasize different elements of the SCA requirements. For example, Shapiro drops the third component (mutual support) in his account. See Adler, supra note 24, at 751.
51
Himma, supra note 13, at 132. In addition, Himma argues that while officials
may also be morally obligated to apply the rule of recognition, such an obligation
would rely on the rule’s content. Under the stronger version of the Conventionality
Thesis, which includes SCAs, it is the rule of recognition itself that gives rise to the
obligation. Id.
48
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of recognition to have an autonomous obligating power over officials
because each official has a joint commitment to the activity governed
by the rule. Thus, according to many proponents of inclusive positivism, the rule of recognition is supported by a Strong Conventionality
Thesis that views the rule of recognition as a shared cooperative activity that autonomously obligates officials to apply the rule correctly.
In summary, the inclusive positivists address Dworkin’s criticisms
of Hart by showing that there is nothing in Hart’s account that precludes the incorporation of moral norms as either a necessary or sufficient condition within the rule of recognition in a given legal system.
Furthermore, they combine Hart’s account of the open texture of law
with the distinction between law ascertainment and law application in
order to address Dworkin’s concerns about rule indeterminacy and
judicial discretion generally. Arguably, the most effective inclusivepositivist argument combines the Incorporation Thesis with a strong
form of the Conventionality Thesis that includes an account of the
rule of recognition as an SCA. With such a view in mind, we can now
turn to two previously proposed formulations of the rule of recognition in the United States, evaluating how well they take into account
Dworkin’s criticisms and the inclusivist solutions.
II. PREVIOUS ACCOUNTS OF THE U.S. RULE OF RECOGNITION:
GREENAWALT AND HIMMA
There have been surprisingly few genuine attempts to work out
the contents of the rule of recognition in the United States. This is
partially due to the fact that jurisprudential philosophy tends to be
performed at a highly abstract and removed level, and rarely involves
52
a discussion of any particular legal system.
Furthermore, it is extremely difficult to apply Hart’s supposedly simple rule to the United
States. With myriad complexities (e.g., how to account for state sovereignty, constitutional amendments, popular sovereignty, and judicial
review and precedent), the idea that our legal system could be reduced to one simple rule seems prohibitively difficult. Still, some
have attempted to develop such a rule, and, in this Part, I will analyze
two such attempts: those of Kent Greenawalt and Kenneth Einar
Himma. By evaluating these two accounts, I hope to explore the
complex nature that any formulation of a rule of recognition would

52

Dworkin seems to be the exception to this rule, as he refers primarily to a specifically Anglo-American-type legal system.
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have to take in the United States and build upon their insights to provide the foundation for my own rule.
A. Kent Greenawalt’s The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution
Kent Greenawalt made what may be the first attempt to develop “a
fairly comprehensive account of how one might try to state a rule of
53
recognition for someplace in this country.” Greenawalt’s formulation and corresponding discussion provide an invaluable starting
point by, first, showing how the complex interaction of different bodies of officials, at both the federal and state level, needs to be recognized in any serious American rule of recognition, and, second, showing how certain portions of Hart’s theory will need to be “amplified”
54
to apply to the United States without distortion.
Greenawalt ultimately makes three insights into Hart’s theory: (1) the “relationship
between the ‘ultimate rule [of recognition]’ and the ‘supreme criterion [of legal validity]’ may vary from the one Hart supposes”; (2) the
ultimate standards of the rule may be uncertain at any given time in a
stable legal system, due to the interplay between acceptance by officials and derivation from higher norms; and (3) because of (or, at
least, related to) the second insight, “the ultimate standards may shift
55
unnoticed over time.” Furthermore, Greenawalt takes seriously such
56
complications as the Amending Clause and state sovereignty, giving a
plausible account of how they might be included in the U.S. rule of
recognition. With these insights, Greenawalt provides an excellent
starting point for developing a U.S. rule of recognition, noting the effect of certain idiosyncratic qualities of the American legal system on
Hart’s general theory and providing a helpful example of how one
might deal with them.

53

Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85 MICH. L. REV.
621, 621-22 (1987).
54
Id. at 622. Many of these suggested “amplifications” are more fully developed by
inclusive positivism as described supra Section I.C. Greenawalt wrote his article almost
immediately after the publication of Law’s Empire, and though he accurately highlights
the fault lines in Hart’s argument that Dworkin’s criticism exposed, he was writing before Hart and the inclusive positivists had developed their reply. His article thus exists
in an intermediate zone in the development of the argument between the inclusive
positivists and Dworkin, and this proves to be a major weakness. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
55
Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 622.
56
U.S. CONST. art. V.
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First, Greenawalt notes that the relationship between the Amending Clause and the rest of the Constitution demonstrates how the “supreme criterion” and the “ultimate rule of recognition” may be distinct in a way that Hart had not anticipated, in that the supreme
criterion may not necessarily be included in the ultimate rule. For
Hart, the rule of recognition “includes an account of a ‘supreme crite57
rion’ which is all or part of the ultimate rule.” Greenawalt’s argument here is complex and subtle, but simply put, he argues that the
Amending Clause must be the supreme criterion for law in the United
States because the “norms adopted according to it take precedence
58
over norms adopted by any other procedure.”
Thus, any amendment added by this procedure is not part of the rule of recognition,
because its validity is justified not by reference to the ultimate rule of
recognition but by how the amendment comports with the Amending
59
Clause. But, Greenawalt asks, is this supreme criterion necessarily
part of the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States? Using a
60
rule of recognition that is comprised of the Ratification Clause,
wherein the legal authority of the Constitution is established with reference to the Ratification Clause in the same way that amendments
derive their validity in reference to the Amending Clause, Greenawalt
notes that “the supreme criterion could derive its own authority from

57

Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 625. Defining the “supreme criterion,” Hart writes

that
a criterion of legal validity or source of law is supreme if rules identified by
reference to it are still recognized as rules of the system, even if they conflict
with rules identified by reference to the other criteria, whereas rules identified
by reference to the latter are not so recognized if they conflict with the rules
identified by reference to the supreme criterion.
HART, supra note 2, at 106.
58
Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 632.
59
Id. at 637. Greenawalt notes two complications with regard to the Amending
Clause being the supreme criterion. First, the clause has an open texture in that some
questions are not answered by it (for example, can an amendment declare itself to be
unamendable? Amend the Amendment Clause? Do away with the entire Constitution?). Id. at 632-33. Second, as noted by Bruce Ackerman, there may be extra–Article
V amendments that are validated by longstanding official acceptance (for example, the
Civil War amendments, which arguably were not enacted by proper Article V procedure) and thus the supreme criterion may need to be reformulated to take account of
longstanding acceptance as a valid source of law. Id. at 640-42; see also Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013, 1065 (1984)
(“A candid reappraisal of the use made of Article V by the victorious Republican Party
in the aftermath of the Civil War will reveal a series of serious legal problems for any
thoughtful formalist.”).
60
U.S. CONST. art. VII.
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enactment in accord with the ultimate rule of recognition rather than
61
constituting a part of that rule.”
While “[t]he amending clause
would remain the supreme criterion because norms adopted according to it would override other norms,” the supreme criterion itself
would be valid in reference to the ultimate rule of recognition, not as a
62
part of that rule.
Still, based on his second and third insights into Hart’s theory,
Greenawalt does not believe that the current ultimate rule of recognition contains the Ratification Clause. While, at the time of enactment,
the Ratification Clause may have been the ultimate rule, the Constitution as viewed by officials today no longer “stand[s] in the same relation to the ratification clause as the amendments stand in relation to
63
the amending clause.” Greenawalt notes three “salient and related
differences” between the Amending and Ratification Clauses: (1) “the
ratification clause is a one-time-only matter”; (2) “the ratification
clause had no [legal] status prior to the substance of what was to be
ratified by it”; and (3) “[t]he ratification clause cannot be viewed
64
apart from the substance of the Constitution” itself. In addition to
these important distinctions, it is an empirical fact that officials in the
United States do not look to the Ratification Clause as the test for legal validity. As Greenawalt writes, “[T]he legal authority of the rest of
the original Constitution is established by its continued acceptance
and . . . the original ratification procedure is no longer directly rele65
vant to tracing what counts as law.” Here, Greenawalt’s observation
that the ultimate rule of recognition may shift imperceptibly over time
demonstrates how longstanding acceptance may have changed the ultimate rule in the United States from the Ratification Clause to the
contents of the Constitution itself.
From these observations, Greenawalt formulates the rule of recognition with regard to the United States Constitution as follows:
“Whatever the Constitution contains, the present legal authority of
which does not depend on enactment by a procedure prescribed in
66
the Constitution, is law.” This leads to what is, perhaps, Greenawalt’s
greatest contribution to the discussion of the U.S. rule of recognition:
the United States most likely has a hierarchical rule of recognition
61
62
63
64
65
66

Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 644.
Id.
Id. at 638-39.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Id. at 642.
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that is not one single “rule,” but is comprised of a bundle of rules,
each directed at different officials. A complete rule for the United
States must, to begin with, include an account of state governments
and state constitutions, the powers of which are not derived from the
Constitution or the acceptance of federal officials but are limited by
67
both.
Furthermore, Greenawalt recognizes that the ultimate rule
must include the power of judicial precedent in statutory and consti68
tutional interpretation.
However, Greenawalt’s account of these components of the ultimate rule proves unsatisfying. Greenawalt hedges his bet somewhere
between Hart and Dworkin, providing vague rules where there should
69
be crisp ones. It is here that the timing of his article proves problematic. Written right after the publication of Law’s Empire but before
the positivists had formulated a systematic response, Greenawalt does
not make the important distinction between law ascertainment and
law application and grants Dworkin more ground than necessary.
While he correctly diagnoses the problems that Dworkin’s critiques
present, he merely points the way to resolution. The weaknesses in
Greenawalt’s account become apparent through Himma’s formulation
of a rule of recognition and Matthew Kramer’s subsequent critique of
70
that formulation, both of which will be addressed more fully below.
These weaknesses, though, do not undermine the considerable
strengths of Greenawalt’s formulation of a rule of recognition for the
United States. Greenawalt rightly characterizes the United States rule
of recognition as a hierarchical “bundle” of rules that necessarily includes state sovereignty and the principles of judicial review, interpretation, and precedent. Additionally, as discussed below, Greenawalt’s
account of the ultimate rule with regard to the Federal Constitution
requires little reformulation and, with some minor retooling, will be
appropriated into my own rule. Lastly, Greenawalt’s insights into the
separability of the supreme criterion and the ultimate rule of recognition as well as the shifting nature of the ultimate rule itself provide
helpful elaborations to Hart’s theory that are not provided by the
general inclusive-positivist account. Keeping these strengths in mind,
then, we turn to Kenneth Einar Himma’s account to see what can be

67

Id. at 645-47.
Id. at 647-54.
69
For example, Greenawalt’s rules on both constitutional and statutory interpretation begin with the evasive phrase, “On matters not clear from the text.” Id. at 659.
70
See infra Section II.B-C.
68
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added to Greenawalt’s rule in hopes of further developing a truly
comprehensive rule of recognition for the United States.
B. Kenneth Einar Himma’s U.S. Rule of Recognition
The next substantial attempt to develop a rule of recognition for
the United States came almost twenty years after the publication of
Greenawalt’s article, with Kenneth Einar Himma formulating an
71
American rule of recognition in a series of articles. Himma meant
for his articles to serve as an attack on inclusive positivism in general.
Because of this difference in focus, he omitted some of the more important elements of Greenawalt’s work, such as a consideration of the
role of state sovereignty. Instead, Himma mainly concentrates on the
power of the judiciary (specifically the Supreme Court) to bind all
other officials with its mistaken rulings (i.e., rulings in which the
Court misinterprets or misapplies the moral norms incorporated into
72
the Constitution).
This power, Himma argues, demonstrates that
the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States cannot be an inclusive-positivist rule. This is because it is not the moral norms incorporated into the Constitution themselves that determine the legal validity of a given norm, but rather it is what the Supreme Court says
those norms are. As we will see, this argument is subject to several objections, both empirical and philosophical, that cause Himma’s account ultimately to fail as a comprehensive rule of recognition for the
73
United States.
Nevertheless, because Himma does present a thorough and useful analysis of the areas where Greenawalt’s argument
falls short—namely with regard to the effect of judicial discretion and
the nature of judicial authority on the ultimate rule—it is worth careful explication.
Of the particular theses set out as positivism’s conceptual foundations, the two most important to Himma’s argument here are the Dif74
75
ferentiation Thesis and the Conventionality Thesis. These theses
contain both a behavioral element (i.e., Hart’s conventionality) and a
71

Himma, supra note 17; Himma, supra note 31.
See infra text accompanying notes 77-79.
73
See infra Section II.C.
74
“In every conceptually possible legal system S, there is a set of criteria CoV [criteria of validity] such that a norm n is a law in S at a particular time t if and only if n satisfies the criteria contained in CoV at t.” Himma, supra note 17, at 151.
75
“[T]he criteria of validity in every conceptually possible legal system are determined by a conventional rule of recognition that governs the behavior of persons who
function as officials.” Id. at 153.
72
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cognitive element (i.e., Hart’s internal point of view). Himma also
adds what he calls the Modeling Constraint, where “a correct description of the validity criteria in a legal system S must express those properties that, as a matter of observable empirical fact, officials collectively
recognize as giving rise to legally valid norms they are obligated to en76
force.” Thus, one must study the behavior of officials to see what criteria they actually use to determine the validity criteria of a given system.
An adequate positivist statement of the validity criteria must model itself
after those empirically observable methods actually used by officials to
determine which norms will be recognized and treated as law.
Himma argues that Greenawalt’s rule fails the ModelingConstraint test because he does not account for the nature of final authority and therefore does not provide an accurate empirical account
of how officials in the United States determine the validity of law. For
Himma, it is an empirical truth that, in a given legal system, some
body must have final authority to decide contested issues of law. This
77
body, Himma argues, is almost always the courts.
According to
Himma, then, a court has the authority to create an obligation on the
part of other officials in the legal system to apply and enforce its decisions, an obligation that is presumptive unless some higher authority
78
nullifies that decision. The highest court in a given legal system has
final authority because no other authority can nullify its decisions. In
other words, a court with final authority over a decision obligates all
other officials by that decision, and, “since there is no possibility of re79
versal, the obligation is final.” Furthermore, the court with final authority obligates the other officials regardless of whether it has made
the objectively “correct” decision in a given case—right or wrong, the
80
court’s decision is binding and creates a real obligation. As Himma
76

Id. at 158.
See Himma, supra note 31, at 3 (“[T]his much . . . is largely unchallenged among
legal theorists and academic lawyers: in most developed legal systems like those in
Britain, Canada, and the U.S., the courts are vested with final authority to decide substantive issues of law.”). It should be noted that Greenawalt agrees up to a point. See
Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 653 (making an initial assumption that “there is no doubt
that courts are supposed to engage in substantive constitutional interpretation”).
78
See Himma, supra note 31, at 4 (“[I]f a court has authority to decide a particular
issue, then its decision binds the other officials until an appeal to a higher agency overturns the court’s decision.”).
79
Id. at 4-5.
80
Id. at 5-6. The binding effect is present whether we speak of the decision as being morally correct or legally correct, as “a court with final authority can legally bind
other officials with a decision that is mistaken under a variety of standards that may
include . . . both moral standards and legal standards.” Id. at 5.
77
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writes, “Insofar as a court has final authority to decide a substantive
issue of law, it can legally bind the other officials in its jurisdiction,
other things being equal, with either of two conflicting decisions on
81
that issue.”
Because there is no higher authority in the United States court
system than the Supreme Court, Himma argues, the Supreme Court
has the sort of final authority that he describes. Himma acknowledges, however, that this final authority is not without bounds, finding
two constraints placed upon the Court. First, the Supreme Court’s authority is bound by what Himma calls the Plausibility Constraint,
wherein the Court’s decision must be “based on an interpretation of
82
the Constitution that can rationally be grounded in the text.” But
this restriction is not really confining for most practical purposes, as it
“doesn’t amount to much in determining the outcome of validity cases”
because the limit “operates to constrain the Court in justifying its decisions in hard validity cases, but it does not operate to limit the outcomes
83
available to the Court.” It is the second constraint, which requires
the Court to conform its decisions with the morally best interpretation
of the Constitution, that has more practical effect than the first. Under this constraint, “[t]he Supreme Court is obligated to decide the
validity of duly enacted norms according to what is, as an objective
84
matter, the morally best interpretation of the Constitution.” If the
Court makes no apparent effort to ground its judgment in the morally
best interpretation, it is, according to Himma, an empirical truth that
85
the decision will not be upheld by other officials. Thus, for Himma,

81

Id.
Himma, supra note 17, at 167.
83
Id. at 169-70.
84
Id. at 183.
85
Note that this does not mean that the Court must reach the objectively correct
decision that reflects the morally best interpretation in a given case, or even in any
case. The Court must merely ground its decisions in an attempt to determine the
morally best interpretation. The Court’s discretion is constrained, but, because of the
Conventionality Thesis, it is constrained only “by what the other officials are prepared
to accept from the Court in the way of validity decisions.” Id. at 166. Depending on
the actual legal system in question, there may be a wide variety of “interpretations” that
are empirically accepted by officials. In the United States, for example, officially accepted interpretations may run from textualist or originalist interpretations to broader
nontextualist interpretations. The official acceptance of a variety of interpretations
strengthens the Court’s power to bind other officials with its moral mistakes, as long as
those mistakes are grounded in one of the accepted interpretative methods. This observation is one of the strengths of Himma’s account and, as will be explained below, helps
eliminate one of the more vague and unsatisfying components of Greenawalt’s rule.
82
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the ultimate rule of recognition in the United States is simply that “[a]
duly enacted norm is legally valid if and only if it conforms to what the
Supreme Court takes to be the morally best interpretation of the sub86
stantive protections of the Constitution.”
C. Objections to Himma’s Rule
According to Himma, then, Greenawalt’s formulation of the ultimate rule of recognition fails as an empirical account of the Court’s
ability to make mistakes that still bind other officials. Greenawalt considered Himma’s formulation, however, and rejected it:
Since officials generally treat a constitution as saying what the highest
judges say it says, the power of courts to make constitutional law by decisions might initially be thought to be an aspect not only of the ultimate
rule of recognition but also of the supreme criterion, that is, an aspect of
the form of law that takes priority over all other forms of law.
That view would be mistaken, however. Since new constitutional
amendments can override judicial interpretations of the Constitution,
the legal force of constitutional interpretations is not part of the su87
preme criterion of law.

Greenawalt’s anticipatory response points to one of two objections to
Himma’s proposed rule of recognition: the Supreme Court may not,
as an empirical fact, have the final authority that Himma grants to it,
because, for example, Congress, with the approval of the states, has
86

Id. at 186. Himma believes that this formulation, as the only plausible formulation of the rule of recognition in the United States, or any legal system like it, signals
the death knell for inclusive positivism. See Himma, supra note 31, at 15, 38-39.
Himma makes a complicated argument, but essentially asserts that it is a practical and
empirical truth that any plausible legal system cannot incorporate moral norms themselves into the rule of recognition, because those moral norms never apply in their totality. Id. at 26-28. Instead, the rule of recognition will always be what the final authority says that it is. Id. Thus, following Himma’s argument, moral principles are neither
necessary nor sufficient to determine the correctness of a norm’s legal validity in any
circumstance. This is because “the necessary or sufficient condition will instead reside
in the judgments of the Supreme Court.” MATTHEW H. KRAMER, WHERE LAW AND
MORALITY MEET 117 (2004).
Kramer demonstrates the operation of Himma’s thesis as follows: If the Court
thinks that a legal enactment is consistent with some moral principal (P ) the enactment is legally valid regardless of whether or not it is objectively consistent with P.
Similarly, even if it is posited that the correctness of a norm (N) as a moral principle is
a sufficient condition for the status of that norm as law in hard cases, the court with
final authority has the power to reject N as law in hard cases and to invoke or apply
some contrary norm. Inappropriate invalidation of N as a legal norm would be determinative of N’s legal status. Id.
87
Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 653.
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the power to reject the Court’s interpretation through constitutional
88
amendment. While practically this is difficult to achieve due to the
cumbersome nature of the amendment process, this does not change
the fact that the power exists. Thus, to test Himma’s thesis, we must
determine who, if anyone, actually has final authority in the United
States. If it is not the Supreme Court, Himma’s formulation of the
rule is empirically incorrect. Additionally, Matthew Kramer offers the
second objection by defending inclusive positivism from Himma’s attack and thus providing a critique of Himma on a philosophical level.
By taking what survives this dual critique of Himma’s rule and combining it with the strengths of Greenawalt’s formulation, one can construct a superior rule of recognition for the United States.
1. Empirical Objections
What Himma takes to be the uncontroversial centerpiece of his
theory—a sort of judicial sovereignty in the United States—is, in fact,
one of the most controversial topics in constitutional theory. While
there is some evidence that the Court may view itself as having final
authority in constitutional interpretation, as indicated by Justice
89
Frankfurter’s opinion in Cooper v. Aaron, Cooper itself is controversial
90
amongst constitutional scholars.
A central problem in applying
Hart’s theory of law to the United States, then, lies in the difficulty of
identifying that group that acts as the “official” body (in Hart’s termi91
nology) or “recognitional community” within the system.
It may
be—as Himma suggests—the Supreme Court, but it could also be a
number of other options: for example, all governmental officials (as
92
Hart believes ), a division between officials in different political

88

The fact that the Court defers to Congress as to whether an amendment has
been validly passed further reinforces the notion of constitutional amendment as a
limitation on the Court’s final authority. See Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 634-36 (“Exactly what authority the political branches have in settling the validity of amendments
is now far from clear, but the leading case on the amendment process indicates that, at
least in respect to many issues, Congress makes the final decision whether an amendment has been properly adopted.” (citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939))).
89
358 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that the Supreme Court is “the tribunal specially charged with the duty of ascertaining and declaring what is ‘the supreme Law of the Land’”).
90
See Adler, supra note 24, at 724 (“Many scholars reject Cooper . . . .”).
91
See id. at 726 (noting the varied options for defining the recognitional community, including personhood, citizenship, territorial presence, or title).
92
See HART, supra note 2, at 117.
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branches (as Greenawalt seems to suggest ), or perhaps even the
people themselves (as posited by popular constitutionalists like Ac94
kerman ). The questions then become which of these is the most accurate empirical description of the current American legal system,
and, if it is different from what Himma presents, what does that do to
Himma’s theory?
As explained in Part I, Hart (and positivism generally) holds that
only the officials in a legal system are required to take the internal
point of view toward a system’s rule of recognition, and thus it is official practice alone that provides the foundations of a given legal system. Some positivists, like Joseph Raz and (as we have seen) Himma,
go even farther and argue that it is not official practice generally, but
95
judicial practice specifically, that provides this foundation. Such a
96
view points to what constitutional theorists call judicial supremacy.
But many other constitutional theorists take different views of how the
97
American legal system actually works.
Alternatives to judicial supremacy include popular constitutionalism (official responsiveness to
98
popular elections in the form of “constitutional moments”), judicial
99
deference on certain classes of constitutional issues, the sharing of

93

See Greenawalt, supra note 53, at 634-36.
See Ackerman, supra note 59, at 1017-18.
95
See Adler, supra note 24, at 723. Joseph Raz floats the possibility that there may
be multiple rules of recognition in a given legal system. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT
OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 200 (2d ed. 1980) (“[There may be] various rules of recognition,
each addressed to a different kind of official[].”). Adler goes even farther, arguing
that there may be multiple legitimate recognitional communities in a given legal system. Adler, supra note 24, at 746.
96
See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997) (defending the concept of judicial supremacy in the United States).
97
See, e.g., Adler, supra note 24, at 721-26 (highlighting the views of Kramer’s
popular constitutionalism and Dworkin’s focus on social practices).
98
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 59, at 1021-22 (describing constitutional politics,
as opposed to normal politics, as a “form of political action . . . characterized by Publian appeals to the common good, ratified by a mobilized mass of American citizens
expressing their assent through extraordinary institutional forms . . . during rare periods of heightened political consciousness [deemed ‘constitutional moments’]” (footnotes omitted)); see also Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term—Foreword: We
the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 5, 60-74 (2001) (arguing that popular constitutionalism
was ingrained into the Constitution by the Framers).
99
Examples of judicial deference include rational basis review of certain types of
legislation and the political-question doctrine. See, e.g., James B. Thayer, The Origin and
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 143-52 (1893)
(suggesting a clear-error approach to constitutional interpretation by the judiciary); see
also Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
94
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authority between branches (so-called departmentalism), complete
deference to another branch (such as executive supremacy or, at least,
101
102
executive review), or a wholesale rejection of judicial review (or
abandonment of judicial review in certain specific constitutional ar103
eas, like the Bill of Rights ). All of these views pose some sort of
threat to Himma’s empirical assumption of judicial supremacy and
deserve consideration.
First, however, one must look at the above-suggested practices and
determine which practices are descriptive—offering an empirical account of the actual practice in the United States—and which practices
are prescriptive—offering accounts of how the American legal system
should or ought to be. For example, wholesale or even partial rejections of judicial review—such as those presented by Tushnet and Waldron—are not meant to be empirical accounts of how the American
legal system currently operates, but rather suggestions for how it could
work better. Nor does a theory of executive supremacy accurately de104
scribe current official practice in the United States.
Ultimately,
therefore, these theories do not challenge Himma’s strictly empirical
observations. Other theories, such as accounts of judicial deference
or underenforcement, logically assume that the Court has the power
to rule on restricted classes of issues but, for a variety of reasons,
chooses not to. In these cases, deference to other political actors is determined by judges themselves, and, therefore, such theories still assume some level of judicial supremacy. A judge may view her role as
being constrained by some theory of deference or underenforcement,
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1213-20 (1978) (arguing that institutional constraints
prevent the judiciary from fully enforcing certain constitutional norms).
100
See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 401, 417 (1986) (describing a “modified version of departmentalism” that “ascribe[s] different areas of competence” to the various
branches).
101
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905,
905-11 (1989–90) (discussing the President’s power to review constitutional issues in a
manner akin to judicial review); Michael Stokes Paulson, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 217 (1994) (arguing that “the
President has coequal interpretive authority with the courts”).
102
See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
(1999) (denying all notions of singular supremacy within the three branches of government).
103
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE
L.J. 1346, 1348, 1380-82 (2006) (arguing that judicial review is countermajoritarian
and should not extend to the Bill of Rights).
104
See Murphy, supra note 100, at 420 n.28 (“No president has seriously pushed
presidential supremacy.”).
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but she is only restricted because she views her role as such—the ulti105
mate rule of recognition is still defined by judicial practice.
Thus, only popular constitutionalism and true departmentalism
(granting all United States officials some kind of final authority on
constitutional interpretation) potentially pose a problem for Himma’s
argument, as these accounts move the locus of final authority—either
to different branches of the government or to the people themselves.
As a preliminary matter, however, it is not clear that moving the locus
of final authority changes Himma’s argument. The nature of final authority itself poses the problems explored by Himma. If it is an empirical truth that for a legal system to be effective and sustainable,
some person or body of persons must have final authority over constitutional interpretation, exactly who that body is will simply be a matter
106
of observable official practice.
As long as some person or body has
final authority, Himma’s argument remains largely intact, even if the
107
Thus, theories like
wording of his rule would need to be revised.
departmentalism, if true, would change the content of Himma’s rule,
but would not affect the overall argument supporting that rule.
Putting this preliminary matter aside, Himma’s empirical observation that in almost every case other officials (and the citizenry in general) treat controversial Supreme Court determinations as binding law
seems to be correct. The common examples brought out to contradict this observation (Lincoln’s refusal of the Supreme Court’s order
108
to release a prisoner in the Merryman case and Roosevelt and the
105

See Adler, supra note 24, at 725 (asserting that constitutional interpretation
techniques are themselves determined by judicial practice).
106
Adler provides the original argument that there is no single recognitional body
in the United States, and that there are, in fact, any number of separate recognitional
groups, each with its own rule of recognition. Adler, supra note 24, at 746. If true, this
argument would pose a significant difficulty for Himma’s argument, as there would be
no locus of final authority. Empirically, however, it seems more accurate to say that
the United States system is made up not of multiple, coequal groups, but, rather, of a
series of hierarchical recognitional groups, as described by Greenawalt. While groups
lower down the hierarchy may have a limited authority in their sphere, their decisions
remain subject to modification or even rejection by higher authorities. Himma therefore seems to be more accurate in saying that most recognitional groups in the United
States are under a liability, in a Hohfeldian sense, to have their legal situation changed
by a group with higher authority, up until we reach the group with final authority.
107
See KRAMER, supra note 86, at 115 (“[T]he key point arising from [Himma’s argument] is not the identity of the institution with the final say over the existence and
contents of legal norms; rather, the key point is that some person or body of persons
must have such a final say if a legal system is to be sustainable.”).
108
See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487) (holding that President Lincoln could not suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus).
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New Deal legislature’s rebellion against the Supreme Court’s doctrine
concerning the limits on federal power) are distinguishable from the
general, proper operation of the United States legal system. Lincoln’s
actions took place during a severe governmental crisis and can be
plausibly dismissed as an aberration attributable to the extremity of
the circumstances. And during the New Deal, the Supreme Court
eventually acquiesced to congressional and presidential pressure, and
those rulings ultimately established the post–New Deal limits on federal power. One can plausibly argue that it was not until the Supreme
Court itself changed its interpretation of the Constitution that the
New Deal became valid law. Pressure from the coequal branches of
government certainly influenced the Court, but the Court itself determined the validity of the law. Some form of final authority residing
in the Court, then, seems to be a necessary condition for the stability
and effectiveness of American government. The times when that authority is difficult to locate or rejected by subordinate officials or citizens do not define a legal system, but test it. Challenges to the Court’s
final authority, therefore, should be viewed as possible starting points
of systemic breakdown, not cornerstones. Thus, some form of judicial
supremacy appears to be an empirical fact in the United States system
of law when the system is working properly, as constitutional controversies are settled by the Court in almost all cases, absent extraordinary circumstances.
However, going back to Greenawalt’s theory, judicial supremacy in
the United States is not complete, as constitutional amendment—
either by proper Article V procedure or perhaps by longstanding official acceptance—can override Supreme Court precedent. Thus, the
American rule of recognition should describe a “weak” form of judicial supremacy that includes the possibility of amendment as a check
on judicial authority.
2. Philosophical Objections
Even if Himma is empirically correct (to a degree) about judicial
sovereignty, it is not clear that his argument is philosophically correct.
Matthew Kramer responds directly to Himma’s assault on inclusive
positivism, arguing that Himma mischaracterizes the nature of the
rule of recognition and its relation to courts in a legal system like that
109
of the United States.
Because his argument is a response to

109

See generally KRAMER, supra note 86, at 103-40.
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Himma’s broad attack on inclusive positivism itself, many of Kramer’s
objections deal generally with inclusive positivism and are not ger110
mane to our narrower purposes.
Kramer does, however, highlight
two flaws in Himma’s argument that are useful for formulating a rule
of recognition for the United States. The first concerns the notions of
duty and justification. Kramer argues that the other officials use the
same moral norms to justify their criticism of Supreme Court decisions as the Court itself uses to determine the morally best interpreta111
tion of the Constitution.
Because the two groups look to the same
lodestar to justify their positions, it is that lodestar that provides the
content of the rule of recognition, independently of what the Court
112
says that content is. Second, in line with Greenawalt’s formulation,
Kramer argues that Himma overlooks the multiplicity and rankings of
the criteria within any rule of recognition in a legal system as complex
113
as the United States’s.
While Supreme Court precedent can alter
the meaning of substantive moral norms incorporated into the Constitution, these norms still confer legal validity in all cases not affected
directly by that precedent. Thus, the interplay between Supreme
Court decisions and the substantive moral norms in the Constitution
is more complex than Himma presents, and the Supreme Court’s duty
to adhere to those moral norms in hard cases is stronger than Himma
suggests.
Kramer argues that Himma first errs by mischaracterizing the duty
and power of the Supreme Court. When discussing the Supreme
Court’s “authority” or “discretion” to bind other officials, Himma
really means “the Court’s legal power to bind other officials with its er114
roneous law-ascertaining determinations.”
The terms “‘authority’
and ‘discretion’ are at best misleading” because they imply that the
Court’s power is combined with a legal liberty that the Court does not
115
have. Kramer explains,

110

For an example, see Kramer’s rejoinders concerning Himma’s implicit ruleskepticism and the intension and extension of moral norms. See id. at 119-26.
111
Id. at 126-34.
112
Note, however, that Kramer does not subscribe to Greenawalt’s proposed rule,
and he in fact comes to the view of a hierarchical rule of recognition through his own
line of argument. See id. at 108-09 (critiquing Greenawalt’s position as “too fragmented a portrayal of the process of law-ascertainment”).
113
Id. at 134-37.
114
Id. at 126. Kramer uses the term “power” in the Hohfeldian sense—i.e., the
ability to effect changes in other people’s, and one’s own, legal liability. Id. at 126-27.
115
Id. at 127.
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If someone is legally empowered to accomplish a certain alteration in legal relations but is not legally at liberty to do so, then she does not have
the discretion or authority to do so. She can accomplish the alteration,
116
but she may not; that is, she cannot permissibly accomplish it.

Himma, then, is incorrect in granting the Court liberty to bind other
officials with its erroneous law-ascertaining determinations, as it is under a duty to make its decisions according to the morally best interpretation of the Constitution. The Court breaches that duty when it is
mistaken. Thus, while the Court has the legal power to bind other officials with a mistaken ruling, it does not have the legal authority to
obligate those officials to treat those mistaken rulings as legally determinative. Kramer sees the Court and the other officials as being
117
engaged in a sort of SCA, where the Court has the power to alter
the other official’s legal positions with incorrect judgments but is le118
gally obligated not to do so.
Additionally, Kramer argues that because Himma bases the legal
duty of courts on the proposition that they will receive official censure
when their interpretations of the Constitution are incorrect, he ignores the empirical truth that the Supreme Court meets with criticism
in hard cases no matter what conclusion it reaches. Thus, some group
of officials will criticize the Court regardless of whether its decision is
objectively correct or incorrect. Consequently, Kramer finds an alternate condition for the existence of the Court’s duty in the justificatory
orientation of all official criticism: “If officials converge in taking the
abstract moral categories of the Constitution as their points of reference for applauding or deploring the law-ascertaining determinations
of the Supreme Court, the Court is under a duty to apply those categories correctly when it passes judgment on the legal validity of
119
norms.”
The shared justificatory orientation of both officials and
the Court on the same moral concepts settles the content of the
Court’s duty, whether or not the Court correctly applies those moral
concepts in hard cases. These mistakes, then, are problems of law application, rather than law ascertainment. As Kramer states, the

116

Id.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. Kramer does not employ the
term SCA, but the duty he describes may be fairly characterized as such, as it meets all
three requirements of that standard.
118
See KRAMER, supra note 86, at 127 (distinguishing between legal power and legal
authority in characterizing instances where incorrect Supreme Court decisions force
other officials to treat mistakes as determinative).
119
Id. at 129.
117
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Court’s “missteps are errors of application rather than errors of selection concerning the precepts which they are inclined to invoke as
120
binding upon [the Court].”
Even though a judge can adhere to a shared rule of recognition
while continually misidentifying the principles to be applied or applying incorrect principles in hard cases, Kramer does not deny that incorrect decisions do create precedents that obligate all other officials
in the United States. According to Kramer, however, Himma overlooks the “multiplicity and rankings of the criteria within any complex
121
Rule of Recognition such as that in the American legal system.”
While Himma is correct that whenever the Court rules on the validity
of a given norm as law, its ruling settles the status of that norm, he
“errs in thinking that the Supreme Court’s legal power to settle the
status of norms as valid laws is incompatible with the emergence of
norms as laws through other means,” such as an incorporationist cri122
terion.
A Supreme Court decision binds only within the “precedential purview” of that decision, displacing a larger moral norm in the
123
rule of recognition in only a piecemeal fashion.
Misapplication,
then, “displaces some moral precept that is optimal for addressing
hard cases of some type, and substitutes for it an inferior precept
which has thereby gained the status of a law for addressing the cases of
124
that type.”
But the incorporated moral criteria give way only in cases of conflict. In all other respects, the unadulterated moral criteria continue
as valid criteria for identifying law. Furthermore, the shared justificatory orientation of all United States officials preserves the criteria as
125
valid even in the face of frequent misapplication.
In summary,
then, even in the case of mistaken applications, substantive moral cri-

120

Id. at 130. Kramer discusses three notably anomalous or “odd” properties of
the Court’s law-ascertaining duty. First, the Court is undeniably empowered to produce results that it is duty-bound to avoid. Second, the Supreme Court’s duty does not
seem to be backed by any real force or threat of force, and it is thus a nominal obligation. And, lastly, the sole means of backing up this nominal obligation is brought to
bear on all decisions in hard cases, correctly or incorrectly decided. Id. at 131-33.
121
Id. at 134.
122
Id.
123
See id. at 135 (noting that “[i]n a situation of multiple law-validating criteria
that are ranked, the priority of one criterion over another does not result in the wholesale elimination of the latter”).
124
Id. at 136.
125
See id. at 136 (“Insofar (albeit only insofar) as that effect does not clash with
anything ordained by superior criteria in the American Rule of Recognition, it abides.”).
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teria incorporated into the United States Constitution will remain operative and bestow legal validity on every moral principle that has not
been set aside by specific Supreme Court precedent.
Therefore, while Himma is correct that Supreme Court Justices
are always under a duty to ground their decisions in the morally best
interpretation of the Constitution, how they are required to make
those decisions is determined not by their beliefs about the extensions
126
of the moral criteria, but by the objective extensions themselves.
And misapplication of those moral norms contained in the rule of
recognition creates a limited precedent that only affects directly related cases. Thus, the moral norm itself remains incorporated into
the system’s ultimate rule.
III. THE RULE OF RECOGNITION FOR THE UNITED STATES:
A PROPOSAL AND DEFENSE
Building on the strengths of the accounts provided by Greenawalt
and Himma, and keeping in mind Kramer’s helpful critique of
Himma’s proposal, I can formulate my own rule of recognition for the
United States. Borrowing Greenawalt’s structure, the inclusivepositivist rule of recognition for the United States today, in hierarchical order, is approximately the following:
(1) All duly enacted norms that do not conflict with the objectively best interpretation of the appropriate part(s) of the
Federal Constitution, which interpretation has not lost its legal force and does not derive its present legal force from enactment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law;
(a) the objectively best interpretation of the Federal Constitution shall be determined by:
(i) existing Supreme Court precedent, unless such
precedent is rejected through proscribed constitutional
amendment procedures; or
(ii) the interpretation of any and all appropriate United
States officials, administrative bodies, or lower-court
judges if Supreme Court precedent does not apply or ex-

126

See id. at 140 (“[T]he officials engage in an Incorporationist practice that absorbs all genuine precepts of morality into the law regardless of whether those precepts
have been discretely identified and designated as such.”).
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isting Supreme Court precedent has lost legal force due
to longstanding official practice.
(2) All norms that conform to the objectively best interpretation (as defined above) of the appropriate part(s) of the Federal Constitution, which interpretation has not lost its legal
force and does not derive its present legal force from enactment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law;
unless:
(a) such norms conflict with existing Supreme Court
precedent that has not lost its legal force due to longstanding official acceptance; or
(b) such norms conflict with duly enacted norms as described in (1).
(3) All duly enacted norms that do not conflict with the objectively best moral interpretation of those parts of the state
constitution (or whatever was adopted in accordance with an
accepted constitution-making procedure), which interpretation has not lost its legal force and does not derive its present
legal force from enactment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law;
(a) the objectively best moral interpretation of the state
constitution (or whatever was adopted in accordance with
an accepted constitution-making procedure) shall be determined by:
(i) existing precedent of the highest state court, notwithstanding rejection of said precedent as enacted
through proper constitutional-amendment procedures
by the state legislature (or appropriate body); or
(ii) the interpretation of any and all appropriate state
officials or lower-court judges if precedent of the highest
state court does not apply, or existing precedent of the
highest state court has lost legal force due to longstanding official practice.
(4) All norms that conform to the objectively best moral interpretation (as defined above) of the appropriate part(s) of
the state constitution, which interpretation has not lost its legal force and does not derive its present legal force from en-
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actment by a proscribed constitutional procedure, are law;
unless:
(a) such norms conflict with existing precedent of the
highest state court that has not lost its legal force due to
longstanding official acceptance; or
(b) such norms conflict with duly enacted norms as described in (1).
This rule grants the Court a strong power of judicial review, but
not complete judicial supremacy, as it recognizes Congress’s power to
reject a court’s ruling through constitutional amendment. And while
it is true that this rule seemingly places a great deal of power in the
hands of the Court, it hews closest to the empirical truth that even
controversial decisions by the Supreme Court are treated as law by
United States officials and will be so treated unless explicitly overruled
127
by the Court or nullified by constitutional amendment. The Court’s
power is also curtailed by retaining Himma’s “original best moral interpretation” language. This language should be read as implying a
strong form of the Conventionality Thesis, wherein all legal officials
are presumed to participate in an SCA. The Conventionality Thesis,
and thus the original best moral interpretation language, carry a
strong limitation on the Court’s power as described by Kramer.
Furthermore, this rule goes a long way toward accounting for the
inclusive positivists’ observations about the ways that a moral norm
can be both necessary and sufficient to count as law in the United
States. Under this rule, a duly enacted norm will only be law if it does
not conflict with the objectively best moral interpretation of the Constitution and if consistency with the moral norms contained in the
Constitution is a necessary condition of a norm’s legal validity. Additionally, a norm has the status of law if it closely conforms to a norm
contained in the Constitution, and thus conformity with a constitu-

127

Take, for example, the debate surrounding a controversial decision like Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). While many officials believe that the decision is mistaken,
it is still held to be law. See Himma, supra note 17, at 161 (adding that “[i]t is true, of
course, that officials sometimes attempt to enact rules that restrict abortion in some
way, but it is also true that they unfailingly obey the Supreme Court if it strikes down
those rules as unconstitutional”). Proponents of change either argue for the Court to
overrule the decision or implore Congress to make a constitutional amendment in
their favor. Both options are taken into account within this formulation of the rule.
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tional norm is a sufficient condition for legal validity.
However,
both tests for validity are subject to the interpretation of the Supreme
Court, and should the Court err in identifying the correct norm in a
given decision, that erroneous decision is binding down through the
hierarchy.
Lastly, the rule recognizes Greenawalt’s important observations
regarding state sovereignty and retains the echoing structure that

128

It may be asked what norms, exactly, will fit in the sufficiency category of my
rule. One possibility is Cass Sunstein’s account of the “canons of construction,” or
those background principles that courts use when reviewing and interpreting statutes.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 147-59 (1990). Sunstein defines canons as “reflecting background norms
that help[] give meaning to statutory words or to resolve hard cases.” Id. at 149. These
“interpretive principles” (borrowing Dworkin’s terminology), while never officially
codified by the legislature or explicitly passed down through legal precedent, may be
said to be “law” because they are applied by courts in the interpretation of statutes.
Sunstein explains that these canons include, but are not limited to, principles that derive “from policies that have a firm constitutional pedigree” that may thus be treated as
a form of “‘constitutional common law’” that has “a kind of constitutional status.” Id.
at 155 (citing Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1975)). Sunstein gives as examples the principle that “statutes enacted by Congress should not lightly be taken to preempt state
law” and the rule of lenity in criminal law, which “counsels courts narrowly to construe
criminal statutes in the event of vagueness or ambiguity,” a principle “rooted in [constitutional] notions of due process.” Id. at 156. Thus, these canons may be said to conform to a constitutional norm (such as due process) such that they have legal validity
without having been positively enacted as law.
Another example may be found in the Supreme Court’s state-sovereign-immunity
jurisprudence, a constitutional principle (in the Dworkian sense) of which the Eleventh Amendment is simply one manifestation. In cases establishing this principle, the
Court has stated that
the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited by,
the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear,
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty
which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999). As the Court wrote, “The Eleventh
Amendment confirmed, rather than established, sovereign immunity as a constitutional
principle.” Id. at 728-29 (emphasis added). Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the
principle that an unconsenting state may not be sued in its own court is law because it is
consistent with a moral norm that underlies the Constitution’s structure and history,
even though the moral norm is not articulated in the Constitution itself. See id. at 728
(discussing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), and Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890), and stating that “[t]hese holdings reflect a settled doctrinal understanding . . . that sovereign immunity derives not from the Eleventh Amendment but from
the structure of the original Constitution itself”). The principle of state sovereign immunity, then, may be said to derive sufficient legal validity from its conformity with the
structure of the Constitution itself.

1196

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 157: 1161

Greenawalt included in his rule. Retaining Greenawalt’s structure also
meshes with Kramer’s notion of a hierarchical rule that allows for moral
norms to retain their extension both before and after judicial interpretation. Thus, this rule combines the strengths of previous attempts at
the American rule while, hopefully, eliminating their weaknesses.
As explained in Section II.C.1 above, many constitutional theorists
reject the notion of judicial supremacy that my rule assumes. This
rule will especially bother popular constitutionalists, as it holds almost
no room for popular sovereignty (with just the limited role afforded
to the citizenry through the Amending Clause). This conflict may be
unavoidable, as the idea of a rule of recognition and the theory of
popular constitutionalism may necessarily be at odds. Hart’s rule requires the existence of officials who are distinct from the general citi129
zenry.
In a few places, Hart indicates that, in a democracy, the official body may, indeed, be the populace at large, but, as this Comment
demonstrates, Hart’s notion of an ultimate rule seems to require some
sort of final authority to settle controversy and provide finality to debates over what the law is. It is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to
place such final authority in the hands of the entire citizenry. Hart’s
theory, then, may simply be incompatible with the central tenet of
popular constitutionalism, perhaps making it impossible to simultaneously hold an inclusive-positivist view of law and a popularconstitutionalist view of the American legal system.
Those concerned with a Court run amok, however, should not be
alarmed by these conclusions. First, under my formulation, the Court
is checked by the process of constitutional amendment. This process,
albeit cumbersome and complex, allows the public, through Congress
and the states, to reject any decision that they find truly outrageous.
Furthermore, the Court is under a very real obligation to ground its
decisions in the best objective interpretation of the Constitution.
Should the Court fail in this obligation consistently, its authority will
almost certainly come into question. But this would be a moment of
governmental breakdown, not the sign of a healthy legal system. If
such a moment of constitutional crisis occurs, the government of the
United States itself would be under threat. No formulation of a rule
of recognition can, or should be expected to, account for such a crisis.
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See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Applying Hart’s theoretical construct of the rule of recognition
proves fruitful both to legal philosophy and constitutional theory.
Building upon the empirical and philosophical observations of
Greenawalt, Himma, and Kramer, supplemented by the theory of inclusive positivism generally, it is possible to provide at least a plausible
description of the form that an inclusive-positivist rule of recognition
must take in the United States today. This rule shows how a real legal
system can incorporate moral norms in the way described by inclusive
positivists. And the positivist account uncovers the inner workings of
the American legal system, especially the role that final authority must
play in any ordered legal system. However, in applying theory to fact,
serious issues are raised about the compatibility of a positivist legal
philosophy with certain theories of American constitutional law, most
importantly those theories involving any notion of popular constitutionalism. If the inclusive positivists are correct in their account of the
nature of law itself and the rule proposed above (or something similar) is indeed the rule of recognition in the United States, the plausibility of some of the oldest accounts of the nature of U.S. law may be
on uncertain ground.

